

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 278

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 8, 1975

(SALT TWO - 719)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 8, 1975.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, AUGUST 8, 1975

IN LINE WITH THE WISHES EXPRESSED, THE USSR DELEGATION
TODAY INTENDS TO ADDRESS THE GENERAL PREMISES AT THE BASIS
OF THE SOVIET SIDE'S POSITION ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STANDING
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WITH RESPECT TO THE AGREEMENT BEING
WORKED OUT.

AS YOU KNOW, ON JULY 7, 1975 THE SOVIET SIDE, GUIDED BY
THE DESIRE TO REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, TABLED
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A NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE WORDING OF ARTICLE XVIII OF THE JOINT

DRAFT, WHICH GOVERNS THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SCC IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED. THIS A MAJOR CONSTRUCTIVE STEP IN DEVELOPING THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE WORDING OF THAT ARTICLE.

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE INTEREST EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION PRIOR TO THE WORKING RECESS, THAT THE PROVISIONS DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE SCC WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT BE GATHERED IN ONE PLACE. THE SOVIET WORDING OF ARTICLE XVIII, PAR. 2, WHICH SETS FORTHE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC IN A WAY SIMILAR TO THE WAY THEY ARE SET FORTH IN ARTICLE XIII OF THE ABM TREATY, PROVIDES A NECESSARY AND ADEQUATE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF THE SCOPE OF SCC ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION HERE REGARDING THE FACT THAT THE AREA OF COINCIDING WORDINB FOR ARTICLE XVIII HAS BEEN EXPANDED AFTER TABLING OF THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL. IN PARTICULAR, VISUAL EVIDENCE OF THIS IS CONTAINED IN THE WORKING DOCUMENT DEALING WITH THE COMPOSITION OF ARTICLE XVIII, WHICH WAS HANDED OVER IN THE DRAFTING GROUP ON JULY 28, 1975.

NEVERTHELESS, DIFFERENCES STILL REMAIN IN THE TEXT OF THE ARTICLE, RESOLUTION OF WHICH REQUIRES SOME FURTHER WORK.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE QUESTION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC MUST BE RESOLVED IN STRCIT ACCORD WITH THE TASKS WHICH WILL ARISE BEFORE THAT COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH IMPEL-
MENTATION BY THE SIDES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT IN ALL THEIR TOTALITY. THIS IS PRECISELY THE APPROACH EMBODIES IN THE VERSION OF ARTICLE XVIII, PROPOSED ON JULY 7.

OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF CARRYING OUT THE FUNC-
TIONS OF THE SCC WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT IS THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE XVIII, SUBPAR. 2(A), IN THE PROPOSED VERSION, WHICH STATES THAT THE SCC WILL CONSIDER QUESTIONS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AND RELATED SITUATIONS WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED AMBIGUOUS. IT IS NOT ACCIDENTAL THAT THIS PROVISION IS LISTED FIRST AMONG THE
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COMMISSION'S FUNCTIONS. IT SPECIFIES THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK OF THE COMMISSION, WHICH--AND THIS SHOULD BE NOTED--IT HAS BEEN CARRYING OUT SUCCESSFULLY WITH RESPECT TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS NOW IN FORCE.

THE PROVISION UNDER DISCUSSION IS EXCEPTIONALLY BROAD IN SCOPE. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WITH RESPECT TO IM-
PLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED IT IS ADVISABLE

TO PROVIDE FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING QUESTIONS CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AND RELATED SITUATIONS WHICH FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER MAY BE CONSIDERED AMBIGUOUS. ALL, I EMPHASIZE ALL SUCH SITUATIONS AND RELATED QUESTIONS COULD BECOME THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERATION IN THE SCC. THUS, THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE XVIII, SUBPAR. (A), IN THE NEW SOVIET WORDING, WHILE IN NO WAY CASTING DOUBT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WHICH IS AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES, WOULD REINFORCE THIS PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF SPECIFIC SCC ACTIVITIES INVOLVED IN EXAMINING SITUATIONS WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED AMBIGUOUS.

GIVEN THE PROVISION ON AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS, THERE ARE ABSOLUTELY NO GROUNDS FOR THE PROVISION, CONTAINED IN ARTICLE XVIII, SUBPAR. (I), OF THE U.S. VERSION, TO CONSIDER, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, VERIFICATION ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEMS, INCLUDING NEW TYPES. INDEED, IF IT IS AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR CONSIDERATION IN THE SCC THAT ARE ENVISAGED, THEN SUCH A PROPOSAL IS SUPERFLUOUS, INASMUCH AS A PROVISION ON THIS SCORE IS ALREADY CONTAINED IN ARTICLE XVIII AND DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY DOUBTS. IF, HOWEVER, SUBPAR. (I) REFERS TO MEASURES BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, THEN THIS IS WRONG AND THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE IN SUBSTANCE.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT PROVISION OF THE SOVIET VERSION OF ARTICLE XVIII IS SUBPAR. 2(B), WHICH PROVIDES THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SCC THE PARTIES WILL PROVIDE ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS SUCH INFORMATION AS EITHER PARTY CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO ASSURE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED. INCLUSION OF THIS PROVISION IN THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD CONFIRM THE DETERMINATION OF THE SIDES

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TO COMPLY STRICTLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FUTURE AGREEMENT AND WOULD ALSO BE OF IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF STRENGTHENING MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN OUR STATES. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SCC FUNCTION WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROVIDING CONFIDENCE TO THE SIDES THAT THE LIMITATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT ARE FULLY AND STRICTLY OBSERVED. THIS WOULD ACHIEVE ONE OF THOSE MOST IMPORTANT GOALS FOR WHICH THE SCC IS TO BE USED WITH RESPECT TO THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT SUBPAR. (B) IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH SUBPAR. (A), FOR ACTUALLY AND LOGICALLY THEY DEAL PRECISELY WITH QUESTIONS OF ENSURING CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED. IT IS IN THIS SPECIFIC LIGHT THAT THIS QUESTION IS BEING CONSIDERED, AND MOREOVER, THE SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THIS TEXT.

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IN VIEW OF ALL THIS, IT WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED TO INCLUDE AS ONE OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC A PROVISION FOR PERIODICALLY, FOR EXAMPLE TWICE ANNUALLY, EXCHANGING INFORMATION ON THE NUMBERS BY CATEGORY OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES, LIMITED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT. IN ESSENCE, SUCH A PROPOSAL CANNOT BE VIEWED AS OTHER THAN BEING AIMED AT ACTUALLY REPLACING NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AS THE AGREED MEANS OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT UNDER THE PRETEXT OF WHAT IS CALLED COMPLEMENTING THEM. THIS CONCLUSION IS ALSO SUPPORTED BY THE CLARIFICATIONS RECEIVED CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE INFORMATION WHICH, UNDER THE U.S. SIDE'S APPROACH, THE SIDES COULD EXCHANGE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SCC.

THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION WHICH CAN BE OBTAINED BY THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF THE SIDES IS QUITE SUFFICIENT FOR THE SIDES TO BE ABLE TO JUDGE WITH CONFIDENCE WHETHER OR NOT SOME PROVISION OR OTHER OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED IS COMPLIED WITH. AS FOR THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, THEY MUST BE STRICTLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PREMISE
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THAT VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE LIMITATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SIDES.

THE ADEQUACY OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS FOR ENSURING CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE SIDES IS ALSO DEMONSTRATED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, CONTAIN VERY COMPLEX LIMITATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE OF A QUALITATIVE NATURE.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO REMIND YOU THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TENETS THE SIDES HAVE AGREED TO BE GUIDED BY IN RESOLVING QUESTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION; THIS HAS BEEN REAFFIRMED BY THE SIDES REPEATEDLY, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AS WELL. IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE WAS NEVER ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE MEANS IN CARRYING OUT VERIFICATION. WHY THEN ARE PROPOSALS ADVANCED HERE, WHICH ACTUALLY CAST DOUBT ON THE CAPABILITIES OF THESE MEANS? IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SUCH PROPOSALS IN CONNECTION WITH WORKING OUT THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ARE COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED.

TO CONTINUE. THE SOVIET WORDING OF ARTICLE XVIII, SUBPAR. 2 (E), CONTAINS A PROVISION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PARTIES WILL AGREE IN THE SCC UPON PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN CASES PROVIDED FOR BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT. COMPARISON WITH THE WORDING OF SUBPAR. (B) OF THE U.S. VERSION OF ARTICLE XVIII SHOWS THAT ON THIS QUESTION THE VIEWS OF THE SIDES ARE VERY CLOSE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE U.S. VERSION PROPOSES TO SUPPLEMENT THIS PARAGRAPH BY A PROVISION WHEREBY IN ADDITION THE SCC WOULD BE GIVEN THE FUNCTION OF AGREEING UPON PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR REPLACEMENT, AS WELL AS CONVERSION.

IN THIS CONNECTION WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR AGREEING UPON PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR REPLACEMENT AND CONVERSION GOES BEYOND THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. INDEED, IT IS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE THAT, UNDER THE PRETEXT OF A NEED TO GIVE THE SCC CERTAIN

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FUNCTIONS, IN EFFECT A PROCEDURE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED, ACCORDING TO WHICH EITHER SIDE, BEFORE REPLACING ONE SYSTEM BY

ANOTHER WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AGREED AGGREGATE LEVELS, WOULD BE OBLIGED TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE OTHER SIDE CONCERNING PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR SUCH REPLACEMENT AND CONVERSION.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT A PROPOSAL OF THIS KIND CONFLICTS WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF SYSTEMS, WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE SIDES IN DULY RECORDED IN ARTICLES III AND V OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975. FURTHERMORE, THE AFOREMENTIONED PROPOSAL IS IN CLEAR CONFLICT WITH THE PROVISION ON FREEDOM OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT, WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN AGREED UPON IN ARTICLE XI OF THE JOINT DRAFT.

THE CONSIDERATIONS CITED ABOVE ALSO APPLY TO THE PROPOSAL ON PRIOR NOTIFICATIONS. THERE IS NO NEED FOR THEM WHATSOEVER. ALL NECESSARY DATA TO ENSURE CONFIDENCE OF THE SIDES IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE OBTAINED BY THE SIDES THROUGH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL.

THE PROPOSALS ON AGREEING UPON PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR REPLACEMENT AND CONVERSION, AND ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION, CANNOT BE VIEWED AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN ATTEMPTS BY ONE OF THE SIDES TO INTERFERE IN QUESTIONS WHOSE SOLUTIONS ARE ENTIRELY THE PREROGATIVE OF EITHER SIDE. THE FREEDOM TO TAKE SUCH DECISIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED, AS AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES, CANNOT BE MADE CONTINGENT UPON SOME SORT OF OTHER APPROACH OR THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER SIDE.

THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT, ON WHICH ARTICLE, ALONG WITH REMAINING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SIDES, A CONSIDERABLE MEASURE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED, PROVISIONS DEALING WITH PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION AND WITH THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT ARE TO APPLY TO THE ARMS COVERED BY THIS AGREEMENT, AND UNTIL WHEN THESE ARMS WILL CONTINUE TO BE
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SUBJECT TO THE AFOREMENTIONED LIMITATIONS, FULLY RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF KEEPING THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES FROM EXCEEDING PERMISSIBLE MAXIMUM LEVELS. AS FOR THE SPECIFIC ISSUES INVOLVED IN DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES, WHICH MAY ARISE IN THE SCC, THEY MUST BE RESOLVED PRECISELY IN A SPECIFIC MANNER, DEPENDING UPON THE NATURE AND CONTENT OF SUCH ISSUES.

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 278

EXDIS/SALT

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

SUCH ARE SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOVIET SIDE
ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT
BEING WORKED OUT.

WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS ONCE AGAIN THAT ALL THE PROVI-
SIONS OF ARTICLE XVIII IN THE SOVIET WORDING, TAKEN IN THEIR
ENTIRETY, BEING FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE AGREED FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT WILL BE
BASED, ENSURE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF
THE SCC IN THE LIGHT OF THOSE TASKS WHICH EMERGE FOR THE
COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975
IS HELD BY ARTICLE VII, CONTAINING PROVISIONS ON LAUNCHERS
INTENDED FOR TESTING AND TRAINING, AS WELL AS LAUNCHERS FOR
THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE.

IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE WORKING
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RECESS THE SIDES EXCHANGED VIEWS ON HOW THE QUESTION OF THE AFOREMENTIONED LAUNCHERS COULD BE RESOLVED WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985.

IT BECAME APPARENT IN APPROACHING THIS PROBLEM THAT THE BASIC PREMISES OF THE SIDES COINCIDED. A COMMON UNDERSTANDING WAS EXPRESSED TO THE EFFECT THAT ACTUAL NEEDS GOVERN POSSESSION BY THE SIDES OF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, INTENDED FOR TESTING AND TRAINING, AS WELL AS LAUNCHERS OF BOOSTERS OF SPACE VEHICLES FOR EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SIDES DECIDED NOT TO INCLUDE THEM IN THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION ON STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, AS REFLECTED IN ARTICLE VII, PAR. 1.

THE SIDES AGREED TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THE NUMBER OF SLBM OR LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, INTENDED FOR TESTING AND TRAINING.

AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF OUR WORK OPPORTUNITIES EMERGE FOR FINAL CONVERGENCE OF THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES ON THE WORDING OF ARTICLE VII.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. SIDE CONCERNING THE TERMINOLOGY DIFFICULTIES IT ENCOUNTERS, AND DESIRING TO WORK OUT MUTUALLY AGREED PROVISIONS FOR THIS ARTICLE, THE SOVIET SIDE SUGGESTS THE USE OF THE FOLLOWING WORDING IN THIS ARTICLE: LAUNCHERS OF SPACE VEHICLES, LOCATED AT SPACEPORTS AND TEST RANGES. THE PROPOSED TERM PROVIDES AN EXACT DESCRIPTION OF PRECISELY WHAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS PROVISION. IT IS IN ACCORD WITH THE PROVISION, AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES, NOT TO COUNT LAUNCHERS OF SPACE VEHICLES IN THE AGGREGATE BEING ESTABLISHED.

AT THE SAME TIME, THIS WORDING, CONTAINING THE CONCEPT OF LAUNCHERS DEPLOYED AT SPACEPORTS OR TEST RANGES, PROVIDES THE NECESSARY GUARANTEES THAT THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED, WITHOUT INFRINGING UPON THE INTERESTS OF THE SIDES, AND WITHOUT ALTERING ESTABLISHED PRACTICE WITH RESPECT TO THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE.

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AS FOR THE STILL BRACKETED WORDS "LAND-BASED" WITH RESPECT TO ICBM LAUNCHERS, THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT THIS ISSUE

COULD BE RESOLVED IN AGREEING ON THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ARTICLE II OF THE DRAFT. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT BY REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF THIS TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IT WOULD NO LONGER BE NECESSARY TO USE THE WORDS "LAND-BASED" IN A NUMBER OF OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975 AS WELL, AS A RESULT OF WHICH WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GET RID OF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF BRACKETS.

AND STILL ANOTHER QUESTION ON WHICH DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US REMAIN. I AM REFERRING TO ARTICLE VII, SUBPAR. 2 (A). IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE LIMITATION PROVIDED FOR THEREIN APPLIES TO ALL SLBM AND LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, IT APPEARS POSSIBLE, IN THE CONTEXT OF NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES ON THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE, TOO, TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE WORDING CONTAINED IN THE LAST PART OF THIS SUBPARAGRAPH.

WE EXPECT THAT THE U.S. SIDE WILL EXPRESS ITS CONSIDERATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS DEALT WITH IN TODAY'S STATEMENT OF THE USSR DELEGATION.

UNQUOTE JOHNSON

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